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JUSTICE HARLAN AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT* 
Daniel A. Farber** and John E. Nowak*** 
During the Warren Court era a debate raged between "balanc-
ers" and "absolutists." In this debate, balancing referred to a case-
by-case weighing of an individual's interest in free speech against 
the government's interest in regulation, with the government's in-
terest often prevailing. Balancers were viewed as apologists for sup-
pression; those advocating absolute protection for speech were seen 
as the champions of liberal thought and libertarian freedom. Along 
with Felix Frankfurter, Justice John Harlan was (and is) regarded 
as a leading proponent of ad hoc balancing. 
The reader may understandably wonder why more ink is being 
spilled on analysis of John Harlan's balancing approach to first 
amendment problems. Our answer is simple: we believe that 
Harlan's voting record disproves the accepted wisdom that he fa-
vored a case-by-case balancing approach to the resolution of first 
amendment issues. He should be remembered as a champion of 
first amendment freedoms rather than a judicial roadblock to the 
quest for civil liberties by absolutist Justices. Properly understood, 
Harlan's approach is a potentially valuable model for modem first 
amendment analysis. 
By the close of his tenure on the Court, Justice Harlan had 
fashioned a three-part approach to the resolution of first amend-
ment issues. His method varied depending on whether the case in-
volved only a time, place, or manner regulation, an attempt to 
proscribe a message or association, or the regulation of speech be-
cause of a particular governmental interest connected with the con-
text or social impact of the communication or association. 
Harlan apparently agreed with the generally accepted view 
that ad hoc balancing is appropriate for judicial review of time, 
place, or manner regulations, which are based on the physical ef-
fects of a communication method (such as noise). I But when the 
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I. Classic time, place, and manner cases rarely reached the Court during Harlan's 
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government tried to proscribe messages as dangerous, Harlan used 
"balancing" only to establish categories of unprotected speech such 
as obscenity. Today, this would be considered definitional balanc-
ing or a categorization approach to content proscription problems, 
in which balancing is used only to define a category of speech that 
can be punished consistently with first amendment values. After a 
category such as obscenity or defamation was defined, Harlan di-
rected lower courts to follow the Supreme Court's categorical defi-
nition of unprotected speech rather than engage in a case-by-case 
analysis of the worth of the speech versus the government's interest 
in suppression of that speech. 
As is becoming clear to many scholars today, there is a third 
category of cases involving regulation of protected conduct on the 
basis of its special impact on its social or physical environment. 
This category of first amendment problems involves situational reg-
ulation rather than proscription of a message. A situational re-
straint regulates speech in part because of its content, and, hence, is 
more than a content neutral regulation of the time, place, or man-
ner of speech. In these intermediate cases involving regulation 
rather than proscription, Harlan was willing to allow reasonable, 
narrowly focused regulations.2 While this approach involved some 
weighing of governmental interests against first amendment values, 
it was far more structured than mere ad hoc "balancing."3 Justice 
Harlan realized, as the Court is perhaps coming to realize today, 
that context regulation cases cannot be resolved in terms of time, 
place, or manner analysis or the content neutral categorical ap-
proach to governmental proscription of speech. 
John Harlan was never hostile to first amendment values, but 
the strength of his defense of those values evolved throughout his 
tenure on the Court. By the close of his career, his commitment to 
tenure. There are, however, several indications of his adherence to the traditional approach. 
For example, in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960), he said that in evaluating the 
validity of municipal ordinances affecting speech, "I do not believe that we can escape . . . 
'the delicate and difficult task' of weighing 'the circumstances' and appraising 'the substanti-
ality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of' speech." 
In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961), he cited several time, place, and manner 
cases in support of his use of a balancing test. Harlan's votes in several cases in which he did 
not write also were consistent with this test. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); 
Cox v. Louisiana (1), 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
2. See Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 
GEo. L.J. 727, 740-41 (1980). See infra note 147 and accompanying text for Harlan's most 
explicit statement of this approach. 
3. In a recent article, we have advocated an approach similar to Harlan's as a means of 
restructuring first amendment analysis. See Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Pub-
lic Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 10 VA. L. REV. 
1219 (1984). 
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free expression and his three-part approach to protecting it should 
have been clear to all, and should permanently separate him from 
the true ad hoc balancers such as Frankfurter. Indeed, in his later 
opinions Harlan's defense of free speech seems as strong as, if not 
stronger than, that offered by Justices who are commonly consid-
ered defenders of content neutrality. In Street v. New York, 4 for 
example, Harlan wrote for the Court reversing the conviction of a 
defendant who burned a United States flag, over strong dissents by 
Warren, Black, Fortas, and White. Harlan stated in that case that 
"the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely be-
cause the ideas themselves are offensive." Rather, in Harlan's view, 
the "right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing 
order" included expression of contempt for the flag of the United 
States.s Later, in Cohen v. California,6 Harlan wrote for a majority 
in reversing a criminal conviction of a young man who walked into 
a courthouse with a jacket bearing the slogan "Fuck the Draft." In 
Cohen, Justice Black, commonly regarded as a champion of first 
amendment freedoms, joined a dissenting opinion that would have 
held the young man punishable because his activity was "mainly 
conduct and little speech. "7 
While Justice Harlan's opinions in Street and Cohen give care-
ful attention to the societal interests and first amendment values in-
volved in each case, neither involves a form of analysis even 
remotely similar to ad hoc balancing. In Cohen, he noted that the 
young man's activity and his message did not come under any of the 
categories of speech, such as obscenity or "fighting words," where 
the Court had defined a test for speech that could be punished con-
sistently with first amendment values. Harlan was against proscrip-
tion of speech or ideas that did not fall within a limited category of 
punishable activity as defined by previous Court decisions. He ex-
pressed this commitment best in Cohen: 
At the outset, we cannot overemphasize that, in our judgment, most situations 
where the State has a justifiable interest in regulating speech will fall within one or 
more of the various established exceptions, discussed above but not applicable here, 
to the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of 
individual expression. Equally important to our conclusion is the constitutional 
backdrop against which our decision must be made. The constitutional right of free 
expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is 
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 
4. 394 u.s. 576 (1969). 
5. 394 U.S. at 592-93. For a perceptive comment on Harlan's opinions in Street and 
Cohen, see Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice 
Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1006-11 (1972). 
6. 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
7. 403 U.S. at 27 (B1ackmun, J., dissenting). 
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discussion, putting the decision as to what view shall be voiced largely into the 
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a 
more capable citizenry and more perfect policy and in the belief that no other ap-
proach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon 
which our political system rests. 8 
This passage is hardly consistent with the view of Harlan as one 
who engaged in ad hoc balancing. Nor was the Cohen opinion an 
aberration, for Harlan joined some of the Warren Court's most im-
portant first amendment decisions such as New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan9 and Brandenburg v. Ohio. 10 
Misconceptions about Harlan's first amendment jurisprudence 
may be traced to two sources. In the first place, commentators have 
tended to overlook the evolution of his views. This evolution can be 
divided into three stages. In Harlan's early years on the Court, 
from 1955 to 1961, he experimented with a variety of first amend-
ment analyses, including the ad hoc balancing approach advocated 
by Justice Frankfurter. From 1961 to 1967, the types of first 
amendment problems confronting the Court began to change, and 
Harlan's opinions evidence a search for standards prohibiting cen-
sorship of unpopular views while allowing the government latitude 
to achieve important societal goals. During this transitional period 
Harlan began to refine the concept of balancing and define a 
stronger role for judicial protection of first amendment values. Fi-
nally, in his last years on the Court, Harlan became an even more 
powerful defender of first amendment freedoms and a bulwark 
against governmental punishment of unpopular views. Those who 
want a simple dichotomy between balancing and content neutrality 
will find it best to focus on Harlan's early opinions so as to create 
this clear bifurcation; they can then treat his later opinions as aber-
rations rather than the result of a sophisticated first amendment 
theory. 
The second source of confusion concerning Harlan's position 
on first amendment issues stems from the manner in which some 
commentators have examined first amendment problems. If one 
seeks a single test for all first amendment cases one is likely to think 
of Harlan as a balancer. Justice Harlan did favor a kind of balanc-
ing in some areas of first amendment law, such as time, place, or 
manner regulations and the disclosure of speech and associational 
activities by those seeking governmental licenses or employment. 
But by the close of the Warren Court era, it was becoming clear 
that the balancing versus absolutism debate had mistakenly as-
8. 403 U.S. at 24. 
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (limiting libel recoveries against public officials). 
10. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (limiting prosecutions for illegal advocacy). 
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sumed that a single test would fit all first amendment cases. Com-
mentators and Justices today appear more willing to recognize that 
there are distinct types of first amendment problems, which have 
not been, and perhaps should not be, solvable in terms of a single 
test or approach. Justice Harlan, like most scholars and judges to-
day, called for use of a definitional balancing or content neutral ap-
proach when the government sought to proscribe speech or 
association because of the message advocated, and use of a balanc-
ing test for content neutral regulations. The Court now is strug-
gling with a third category of cases in which the government has 
attempted to regulate speech or speakers based upon the impact of 
speech in certain physical or social contexts. Today these cases are 
often analyzed in terms of a distinction between "public" and "non-
public" forums. Harlan pioneered an alternative view of context-
based regulation of speech as he analyzed the role of judges in ex-
amining regulations that did not involve content proscription. 
These cases show Harlan engaged in a form of balancing that, un-
like the ad hoc analysis advocated by Frankfurter, did not lead to 
leniency toward the attempts to proscribe speech. 
Time, space, and our editor forbid us to fully document our 
view of Harlan's place in the development of first amendment doc-
trine. For those who wish to investigate further we have included 
an appendix listing all cases in which Justice Harlan took part and 
in which we have identified a first amendment holding.tt In this 
article we will use a few of those cases to trace the evolution of 
Harlan's first amendment philosophy and, finally, to examine his 
approach to three recurring first amendment issues. 
I 
A 
Harlan's reputation as an ad hoc balancer derives mainly from 
his early years on the Court. He appears to have been strongly in-
fluenced during this period by Frankfurter,12 whose intellect and 
II. That list was compiled by the use of the LEXIS and WESTLAW computer research 
systems. We will use the cases selectively in the comment but believe that the total listing 
supports our view of the evolution of the Justice's first amendment philosophy. 
12. See Harlan, The Frankfurter Imprint as Seen by a Colleague, 76 HARV. L. REV. I 
(1962); Lewin, Justice Harlan: "The Full Measure of the Man," 58 A.B.A. J. 579 (1972); 
Wilkinson, Justice John M Harlan and the Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1186 
(1971). There is some evidence that Frankfurter privately held little respect for Harlan's view 
of first amendment principles and actively sought to convert Harlan to his own philosophy. 
See H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 181-82, 188-89, 193-94 (1981). 
However, Hirsch's interpretation of Frankfurter's papers and career has been criticized. See 
lsenbergh, Felix Frankfurter: The Enigma of H N. Hirsch, 91 YALE L. J. 1018 (1982). 
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charm may have given him a great deal of influence over newly 
appointed Justices.13 In Harlan's case, Frankfurter had some addi-
tional advantages. He and Harlan shared a strong concern for fed-
eralism, which made him a natural guide for Harlan. Moreover, 
Frankfurter had been a close, lifelong friend of Emory Buckner, 
who was Harlan's mentor in private practice.14 Whatever the rea-
son, Justice Harlan frequently voted with Frankfurter and shared 
his label as a balancer. 1s 
Harlan's opinions in this period often contain balancing lan-
guage. In Barenblatt v. United States, 16 for instance, he found "the 
record . . . barren of other factors which in themselves might 
sometimes lead to the conclusion that the individual interests at 
stake were not subordinate to those of the state." Hence, he said, 
"the balance between the individual and the governmental interests 
here at stake must be struck in favor ofthe latter .... "17 Harlan's 
reputation as a balancer was cemented when Justice Black used 
Barenblatt and other Harlan opinions as occasions for blistering at-
tacks on balancing.ls 
Although balancing played an important role in Harlan's opin-
ions, he also made some substantial contributions to first amend-
ment freedoms in this period.19 On June 17, 1957, the Court 
decided three cases that exemplify Harlan's commitment to the first 
amendment. In Yates v. United States,2o Harlan wrote for the 
Court, finding that federal statutes could not prohibit general advo-
cacy of the overthrow of the government as an abstract principle. 
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,21 he joined an opinion by Justice 
Frankfurter that sought to protect the academic freedom of teach-
13. See J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DoUGLAS 200-
09 (1980). 
14. SeeM. MAYER, EMORY BuCKNER, 2·5, 290 (1968). Justice Harlan formed a com-
mittee to make arrangements for the publication of a biography of Buckner. /d. at 2. 
15. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 851-64 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); In-
ternational Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 797 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (Frankfurter and Harlan concurring without 
opinion); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, 
J., joined by Harlan, J.); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Konigsberg v. State Bar (1), 353 U.S. 252, 274 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); id. at 276 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 
232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
16. 360 u.s. 109 (1959). 
17. /d. at 134. 
18. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140-45 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); 
Konigsberg v. State Bar (II), 366 U.S. 36, 61-71 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
19. Even before going on the bench, Harlan had demonstrated an interest in free speech 
in his unsuccessful attempt to overturn a lower court opinion prohibiting Bertrand Russell 
from teaching at City College. See Lewin, supra note 12, at 581. 
20. 354 u.s. 298 (1957). 
21. 354 u.s. 234 (1957). 
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ers and free speech in a college setting with a strong definition of 
this freedom and of first amendment principles. As the Justices 
stated: "For a citizen to be made to forego even a part of so basic a 
liberty as his political autonomy the subordinating interest must be 
compelling."22 In the third case, Watkins v. United States,23 Harlan 
joined the majority opinion reversing the conviction of an individual 
for his failure to answer questions from the House Un-American 
Activities Committee. 
In 1958, in NAACP v. Alabama,24 Harlan wrote the earliest 
Supreme Court opinion explicitly recognizing the freedom of associ-
ation as an independent first amendment right. His opinion gave a 
clearer statement of the need for freedom of political association 
than any prior decision, and allowed the NAACP to assert the 
rights of its members so as to protect free speech and associational 
rights. The opinion endorsed the principle that judges must give 
the "closest scrutiny" to state actions curtailing the right of associa-
tion because "effective advocacy of both public and private points of 
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by 
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by 
remarking upon the close nexus between freedoms of speech and 
assembly."2s For the government to punish association because of 
the ideas or messages advocated by the association the governmen-
tal "subordinating interest . . . must be compelling. "26 
At the close of this era Harlan's concern for the protection of 
unpopular ideas was demonstrated by his concurrence in the deci-
sion in Talley v. California 21 striking down an ordinance forbidding 
the distribution of anonymous handbills. Frankfurter, with his bal-
ancing approach, would have upheld that type of law. 
In the Court's first modern obscenity case, Roth v. United 
States,2s Harlan showed a stronger concern for first amendment 
freedoms than Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion. 
Unlike Brennan, he demanded an examination of the materials in 
22. /d. at 265 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Barenblatt v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (per Harlan, J.) ("this Court will always be on the 
alert" against intrusions into academic freedom); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (ban on anonymous parnphleting invalid where not supported by 
compelling interest). The Sweezy plurality held, in a rather opaque opinion, that an investiga-
tion violated the first amendment because the scope of the delegation to the investigating 
officer was insufficiently clear. 354 U.S. at 254-55 (opinion of Warren, C.J.). 
23. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
24. 357 u.s. 449 (1958). 
25. /d. at 460-61. 
26. !d. at 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)). 
27. 362 u.s. 60, 66 (1960). 
28. 354 u.s. 476 (1957). 
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each obscenity case to determine if they were properly banned. 
Harlan was willing to allow the states broad leeway in regulation of 
obscenity. In his view, however, the legitimate sphere of federal 
regulation was narrowly circumscribed. The federal government 
had little legitimate interest in regulating public morals, and federal 
censorship posed a much greater danger than state regulation of 
suppressing the communication of ideas. While balancing entered 
into his analysis, he seemed to be striving to define categories of 
unprotected speech, rather than balancing on a case-by-case basis.29 
By the end of this period, Harlan was beginning to articulate a 
clear distinction between government proscription of speech and 
governmental regulations merely burdening speech. In Konigsberg 
v. State Bar (II),3o he made his most complete attempt to explain his 
approach. For Harlan, "constitutionally protected freedom of 
speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk" in two quite 
different ways.3I First, "certain forms of speech, or speech in cer-
tain contexts, have been considered outside the scope of constitu-
tional protection."32 These exclusions are required to reconcile the 
first amendment with "valid but conflicting governmental inter-
ests."33 Harlan's language seems to suggest, though not very 
clearly, that these conflicting interests are used to define categories 
of excluded speech rather than as a basis for ad hoc balancing.34 
Second, content neutral regulations of activity accompanying ex-
pression were permissible in a variety of contexts. 
[G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but inci-
dentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law 
the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when 
they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a pre-
requisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the gov· 
ernmental interest involved .... Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional 
protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a recon-
ciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the 
29. /d. at 496-508. The relationship between Harlan's position on obscenity and his 
general views about federalism is discussed in Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1216-17. For 
further discussion, see Part liB of this article. 
30. 366 u.s. 36 (1961). 
31. /d. at 50. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. at 50 n.ll. 
34. The phrase "certain forms" suggests that a determinate category is involved, 
whereas the phrase "various forms" would have suggested a more open-ended, ad hoc selec· 
tion. Two sentences earlier, Harlan had said that freedom of speech was an absolute "in the 
undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail . . . ." /d. at 
49. Some commentators took this to be a move away from balancing. See Poe, The Legal 
Philosophy of John Marshall Harlan: Freedom of Expression, Due Process. and Judicial Self-
Restraint, 21 VAND. L. REV. 659, 678·79 (1968). It probably meant only that balancing took 
place in determining whether first amendment protection applied, rather than after such a 
determination. 
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respective interests involved. 35 
Judicial balancing was to be done on a case-by-case basis only when 
the government was not engaged in content proscription or punish-
ment of an association. In the remainder of his career, Harlan 
would clarify and elaborate this approach. 
B 
During the next period of Harlan's tenure on the Court, first 
amendment issues seem to have received less of his attention, per-
haps because his energies were devoted to dissenting from some of 
the Warren Court's innovations in other areas.36 Some of his opin-
ions in this era superficially support to the view that he was an ad 
hoc balancer. In several dissents, for instance, he attempted to ex-
plain the reasonableness of various state regulations.37 Those cases 
involved regulation in the name of interests unrelated to speech, 
rather than proscription of disfavored messages. For example, 
Harlan was willing to uphold regulations protecting the fiduciary 
relationship between lawyer and client, even when those regulations 
impinged on the activities of the NAACP. But he reacted to a state 
effort to ban the NAACP with the harshest language to be found in 
any of his opinions.3s When suppression of speech was at issue, 
Harlan's rejection of ad hoc balancing was shown by his support for 
the Supreme Court's sweeping rewriting of state libel laws in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.39 It was also shown by his use of the 
clear-and-present-danger test in Wood v. Georgia,.w in which asher-
iff had used press releases to try to influence a grand jury 
investigation. 
Most of the cases in this period fall into two classes, neither of 
which the Warren Court was able to resolve very successfully. In 
one set of cases, the Court attempted to define the boundaries of 
permissible public demonstrations. It struggled to explain why 
demonstrations were permissible in some locations but not others, 
35. Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 50-51. 
36. For a discussion of Harlan's role as a dissenter from major Warren Court decisions 
in this period, see G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 358-67 (1976). 
37. See Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 576 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 830 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
38. Compare NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (reversing injunction barring 
NAACP from doing business in Alabama), with NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 448 (1963) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (restrictions on control of litigation by third parties should be held 
valid as applied to NAACP). 
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 402 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) 
(Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion). 
40. 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
434 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:425 
and why various forms of conduct were permissible while others 
were not. Along with Justice Black, Harlan normally voted to up-
hold reasonable restrictions on demonstrators.4I Second, in a string 
obscenity cases, the Court was unable to muster a majority for any 
one approach to the definition of this category of unprotected ex-
pression. Harlan continued to believe that his Roth approach pro-
tected the free exchange of ideas while leaving scope for states to 
protect public morals. Some elements of his Roth approach became 
part of a plurality test, which controlled the outcome of most of the 
cases. 42 In several obscenity cases, Harlan was strikingly more pro-
tective of civil liberties than Chief Justice Warren. Indeed, Harlan 
attacked Warren's approach as too ad hoc, too keyed to the circum-
stances of each individual case, to give fair notice. Harlan preferred 
to define categories of unprotected speech rather than engaging in 
an ad hoc analysis like Warren's.43 
Studying the opinions of this period, one can discern two im-
portant developments in Harlan's first amendment methodology. 
First, he built on his Konigsberg II foundation.44 He seemed more 
and more inclined toward using a categorical approach in suppres-
sion cases, using balancing only to define the categories of speech 
subject to prohibition.4s Second, he showed increasing concern 
with legislative clarity. In one obscenity case, for example, he 
chided the Court for having in effect rewritten the federal obscenity 
law, "but without the sharply focused definitions and standards nec-
essary in such a sensitive area."46 Both developments were to prove 
important in laying the foundation for his mature view of the first 
amendment. 
41. Harlan and Black voted together in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Brown 
v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964). In Cox v. 
Louisiana (II), 379 U.S. 559, 591 (1965), Harlan agreed with Part III of Black's separate 
opinion. 
42. See J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1014-16 (2d ed. 
1983). 
43. See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text. 
44. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
45. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 96-100 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (endorsing New York Times approach to libel law); Lamont v. Postmaster 
Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Harlan, J.) (compelling 
interest required for even incidental burden on speech); NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760 
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (allowing regulation where the means of communication is 
likely to have effects caused by something apart from the message conveyed); NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 455 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (absent "the gravest danger to the 
community," speech and advocacy "must remain free from frontal attack or suppression," 
but "speech plus" can be regulated, subject to a balancing test). 
46. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 494 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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c 
During his final years on the bench, Harlan joined some of the 
Court's most liberal opinions. On occasion, he authored opinions 
considered too libertarian by several more "liberal" Justices.47 
By this point in his career, Harlan had clearly disavowed ad 
hoc balancing in governmental proscription cases. In Coates v. City 
of Cincinnati,4B for example, he joined in reversing convictions 
under a statute making "annoying" conduct illegal where the rec-
ord simply described the defendants as either demonstrators or la-
bor picketers.49 Justice Black and three other members of the 
Court wanted to remand for factual findings,so but Harlan, suppos-
edly the ad hoc balancer, preferred to strike down the statute on its 
face.st In Rosenbloom v. Metromedias2 Harlan criticized Justice 
Brennan's plurality opinion for taking too much of an ad hoc ap-
proach in a libel case: 
Once the evident need to balance the values underlying each is perceived, it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utilitarian approach would be to 
scrutinize carefully every jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected whatever First Amendment values 
transcend the legitimate state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who pre· 
vailed. This seems to be what is done in the plurality opinion. But we did not 
embrace this technique in New York Times. Instead, as my Brother MARSHALL 
observes, we there announced a rule of general application, not ordinarily depen-
dent for its implementation upon a case-by-case examination of trial court ver-
dicts. . . . At least where we can discern generally applicable rules that should 
balance with fair precision the competing interests at stake, such rules should be 
preferred to the plurality's approach both in order to preserve a measure of order 
and predictability in the law that must govern the daily conduct of affairs and to 
avoid subjecting the press to judicial second-guessing .... 53 
47. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. I5 (197I); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 
(1969). 
48. 402 U.S. 6I I (197I). 
49. ld. at 6I2. 
50. See id. at 6I6 (opinion of Black, J.); id. at 620-2I (White, J., dissenting, joined by 
Justice Biackmun and Chief Justice Burger). 
5 I. The ordinance in question made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble" 
on a sidewalk and "conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by . . . ." 
/d. at 6 I I. The majority opinion, which Harlan joined, held the ordinance invalid on its face 
because 
[i]t makes a crime out of what under the Constitution cannot be a crime. It is aimed 
directly at activity protected by the Constitution. We need not lament that we do 
not have before us the details of the conduct found to be annoying. It is the ordi-
nance on its face that sets the standard of conduct and warns against transgression. 
The details of the offense could no more serve to validate this ordinance than could 
the details of an offense charged under an ordinance suspending unconditionally the 
right of assembly and free speech. 
/d. at 6I6. 
52. 403 u.s. 29 (1971). 
53. Id. at 63. 
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Thus, by the end of his career, Harlan had clearly chosen defini-
tional balancing in governmental proscription cases.s4 
In approaching governmental burdens on speech falling short 
of proscription, Harlan's main concern was to distinguish legitimate 
regulations from censorship. In an obscenity case, for example, he 
spoke of "the First Amendment right of the individual to be free 
from governmental programs of thought control, however such pro-
grams might be justified in terms of permissible state objections."ss 
This concern was also reflected in his handling of public demonstra-
tion cases and in loyalty cases.s6 
The last decision Justices Black and Harlan participated in was 
the Pentagon Papers Case.s1 This decision helped to refurbish 
Black's reputation with civil libertarians. Harlan's willingness to 
continue a temporary injunction against publication of the Penta-
gon Papers confirmed his low reputation as a defender of free 
speech. But to put Harlan's vote in perspective, one should recall 
that his views were tentative and announced in the context of what 
he called the Court's "almost irresponsibly feverish" handling of 
the cases.ss Second, even counsel for the newspapers agreed that an 
injunction could properly issue if publication would cause a severe 
enough injury.s9 Third, Harlan did not dispute the majority's state-
ment that the government had a "heavy burden of showing justifica-
tion for the imposition of such a restraint. "60 He did think that in 
one of the cases the government had not been afforded an adequate 
opportunity to present such proof, and that in any event the "scope 
of the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Execu-
tive Branch . . . in the field of foreign affairs is very narrowly re-
stricted" by the "concept of separation of powers" under the 
Constitution.6I For Douglas and Black, this was an easy case, 
which should have been decided without oral argument: no matter 
how many lives might be lost as a result of this publication, an in-
junction would never be proper.62 One of the costs of a more 
54. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 
279, 293 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (in libel cases, Court should establish legal standard 
rather than reviewing cases on their facts). 
55. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 359 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
56. See infra notes 163-87 and accompanying text. 
57. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
58. /d. at 753 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
59. Oral argument in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), in 71 
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 239-40 (P. Kurland & G. Casper ed. 1975). 
60. 403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam). 
61. /d. at 755-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
62. See id. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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thoughtful approach to the first amendment is that it requires time 
to think, time not allowed to Harlan in this case. 
The Pentagon Papers Case was atypical of Harlan's final years, 
in that it showed him taking a less libertarian position than Justice 
Black. Throughout his career, Black espoused an "absolutist" posi-
tion, which in practice meant absolute protection for a relatively 
narrow class of activity.63 Harlan provided less complete protection 
to a much broader class of conduct. By the end of their careers, it 
was often Harlan whose approach was the more protective of 
speech. His approach proved especially well suited to dealing with 
novel forms of dissent, when Black's broke down completely.64 As 
the Pentagon Papers Case showed, Black's method retained an ad-
vantage where reflexive responses to traditional censorship were in 
order.6s But since 1960, at least, such cases have been rare, and 
Harlan's more flexible approach has often proved superior. 66 
II 
Having given a general overview of Harlan's development as a 
defender of first amendment freedoms, we will now tum to a more 
detailed examination of some of his opinions. We have selected for 
examination three areas that occupied much of the Warren Court's 
time: "subversive" speech, obscenity, and public demonstrations. 
A 
The early years of the Warren Court overlapped with the era of 
McCarthyism. Much of the Court's attention was given to various 
anti-Communist measures. The cases can usefully be divided into 
two groups: (1) those involving criminal sanctions against Commu-
nists, and (2) those involving investigations into Communism, 
which were often connected with attempts to exclude Communists 
63. See G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION, 390-95, 422-32 
(1977); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. 
REV. 428, 449-50 (1967). 
64. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 1008-11; Kalven, supra note 63, at 448. For example, 
Harlan and Black joined the majority opinion in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968), in which the Court upheld a conviction for draft card burning. Only Harlan added 
the proviso that expressive conduct might still be protected by the first amendment even 
where it met the majority's test for valid regulation, if banning a practice "has the effect of 
entirely preventing a 'speaker' from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not 
otherwise ... communicate." /d. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also infra notes 
163-87 and accompanying text. 
65. We certainly do not denigrate the value of having guaranteed, readily available pro-
tection in key first amendment cases, such as that provided by Black's approach. It must be 
recognized, however, that the cost of such protection may be a failure to protect free speech 
adequately in harder cases. 
66. See supra note 3. 
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from various occupations. Let us begin with the criminal prosecu-
tions. Section 2 of the Smith Act made it a crime to "knowingly or 
willfully advocate ... or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or 
propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the 
United States ... by force or violence .... "67 Dennis v. United 
States 6s upheld this provision against constitutional attack. Chief 
Justice Vinson's plurality opinion, and the concurring opinions, left 
it quite unclear whether the clear-and-present-danger test retained 
any vitality, and if not, what protection remained for speech.69 
Some language in the opinions suggests that the harm of future 
revolution is so serious that any speech increasing its probability 
can be punished.7° Other language suggests that the gap between 
speech and future harm is bridged by the existence of a present 
criminal conspiracy to overthrow the government in the future, and 
that the speech must be closely tied to the formation of the 
conspiracy. 11 
Yates v. United Statesn was the Court's first attempt to clarify 
Dennis. The government argued that any advocacy of forceful over-
throw was illegal; the statute permitted only "mere discussion or 
exposition of violent overthrow as an abstract theory. "73 The trial 
judge accepted this argument. He relied on language in Dennis say-
ing that "advocacy of violent action to be taken at some future time 
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 para. I (1982). 
68. 341 u.s. 494 (1951). 
69. See id. at 508-11 (opinion of Vinson, C.J.); id. at 524-28, 55()..52 (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.); id. at 568-70 (Jackson, J., concurring). Douglas's dissent, id. at 581-91, is 
excellent. 
70. See id. at 510 (test is gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability). As 
Schmidt notes, this version of the clear and present danger test establishes a "notoriously 
amorphous standard" and has "symbolized a highly particularistic . . . approach to first 
amendment adjudication." Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom 
and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 460 (1977). 
71. See 341 U.S. at 509, 511, 516-17. The best contemporary discussion of the opinions 
and their possible readings was Gorfinkel & Mack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear and 
Present Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 475 (1951). They suggested the following approach, 
which comes close to that later adopted by Harlan: 
A conspiracy to plan the overthrow of the government by force and violence 
should be a sufficient substantive evil to justify interference with speech that creates 
a clear and present danger of aiding or abetting that conspiracy. And even though 
the actual existence of the conspiracy not be established, if that speech creates a 
clear and present danger that such a conspiracy is being, or is about to be, organ-
ized, interference is warranted. 
In either event, it would be the existence of a conspiracy, pending or impend-
ing, to plan overthrow which constitutes the evil and not the words spoken, the 
intent with which they were uttered, or the eventual result of such a conspiracy. 
/d. at 498 (conceding, however, that the Dennis opinions themselves do not state such a rule). 
Harlan was to take an even stricter approach in Yates by requiring the actual existence of a 
conspiraoy to engage in violent overthrow. 
72. 354 u.s. 298 (1957). 
73. /d. at 313. 
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was enough" to justify a conviction, if coupled with an intent to 
overthrow the government.74 Apparently, in the trial judge's view, 
Dennis "obliterated the traditional dividing line between advocacy 
of abstract doctrine and advocacy of action. "7s 
Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan rejected the govern-
ment's position and narrowly defined the class of speech punishable 
under the Smith Act. The trial judge, he said, had misread Dennis: 
The essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrination of a group in preparation 
for future violent action, as well as exhortation to immediate action, by advocacy 
found to be directed to "action for the accomplishment" of forcible overthrow, to 
violence as "a rule or principle of action," and employing "language of incitement," 
is not constitutionally protected when the group is of sufficient size and cohesive-
ness, is sufficiently oriented towards action, and other circumstances are such as 
reasonably to justify apprehension that action will occur. This is quite a different 
thing from the view of the District Court here that mere doctrinal justification of 
forcible overthrow . . . is punishable per se under the Smith Act. That sort of 
advocacy, even though uttered with the hope that it may ultimately lead to violent 
revolution, is too remote from concrete action to be regarded as the kind of indoc-
trination preparatory to action which was condemned in Dennis.76 
Hence, Justice Harlan concluded, for the statute to apply, "those to 
whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, 
rather than merely to believe in something. "77 He then proceeded to 
examine the record, finding too little evidence of a "call to forcible 
action at some future time," as opposed to advocacy of forcible 
overthrow as an abstract doctrine. 78 Retrials were ordered for de-
fendants connected with Communist Party classes intended to fos-
ter such activities as sabotage and street fighting. Concerning the 
other defendants, there was not enough evidence even to justify a 
retria}.79 
In addition to banning advocacy, the Smith Act also made it a 
felony to be a knowing member of any group advocating forceful 
overthrow of the government.so In Scales v. United States,s1 Justice 
Harlan gave the membership clause a narrow reading. He held that 
membership in the Communist Party could be punished only if the 
member was active in the Party, knew of the Party's illegal aims, 
and had a specific intent to further those aims.s2 Because the Party 
was not named in the statute, the government had to prove in each 
74. /d. at 317 n.21, 320. 
75. /d. at 320. 
76. /d. at 321-22. 
77. /d. at 325. 
78. /d. at 329. 
79. /d. at 330-33. 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 para. 3 (1982). 
81. 367 u.s. 203 (1961). 
82. /d. at 221. 
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case that the Party was devoted to illegal advocacy.s3 In Scales 
such evidence was present,s4 but in Noto, a companion case, the 
conviction was reversed because there was no substantial evidence 
of present illegal advocacy by the Party.ss As Harlan explained in 
Noto: 
We held in Yates, and we reiterate now, that the mere abstract teaching of Commu-
nist theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity 
for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent 
action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future which is both suffi-
ciently strong and sufficiently pervasive to lend color to the otherwise ambiguous 
theoretical material regarding Communist Party teaching, and to justify the infer-
ence that such a call to violence may fairly be imputed to the Party as a whole, and 
not merely to some narrow segment of it. 86 
The "strict standards of proof's7 established in Scales and No to 
put an end to Smith Act prosecutions.ss They also provided the 
foundation for the Court's holding in Brandenburg v. Ohio.s9 In 
Brandenburg, an opinion joined by Harlan, the Court held that ad-
vocacy of illegal action is protected by the first amendment, unless 
the defendant incites imminent lawless conduct. Noto was cited as 
authority for this holding, thus vindicating Harlan's commitment to 
a definitional balancing approach. 
Although Harlan was willing to allow only a narrow class of 
"subversive" speech to be banned, he was more tolerant of govern-
mental inquiries into such activities. Investigations, loyalty oaths, 
and related issues occupied much of the Court's docket up to 1961, 
and continued to come up during Harlan's remaining time on the 
bench.90 In retrospect, three Harlan opinions stand out as especially 
important. 
Barenblatt v. United States91 was his first major opinion in this 
83. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961). 
84. Scales, 367 U.S. at 254-55. 
85. Nato, 367 U.S. at 297-99. 
86. /d. at 297-98. 
87. Scales, 367 U.S. at 232. 
88. Many pending cases against Communist leaders were dropped after Yates, including 
those of the remaining Yates defendants. See Scales, 367 U.S. at 274 n.8 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
89. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
90. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 
258 (1967); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589 (1967); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 
(1966); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investiga-
tion Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Speiser v. Randall, 
357 u.s. 513 (1958). 
91. 360 u.s. 109 (1959). 
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area. In Barenblatt, a former teaching assistant refused to answer 
questions about his alleged Communist Party membership in hear-
ings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities. Justice Harlan concluded that investigating 
Communist Party infiltration into universities was permissible be-
cause of "the close nexus between the Communist Party and violent 
overthrow of the government."92 Given this permissible purpose, 
the investigation was properly conducted: 
[T]he record is barren of other factors which in themselves might sometimes lead to 
the conclusion that the individual interests at stake were not subordinate to those of 
the state. There is no indication in this record that the Subcommittee was attempt-
ing to pillory witnesses. Nor did petitioner's appearance as a witness follow from 
indiscriminate dragnet procedures, lacking in probable cause for belief that he pos-
sessed information which might be helpful to the Subcommittee. And the relevancy 
of the questions put to him by the Subcommittee is not open to doubt.93 
In later cases, the majority attempted, with only moderate suc-
cess, to elaborate similar factors into a "bright-line" test for legisla-
tive investigations.94 Harlan preferred a more general requirement 
that investigations be conducted reasonably and relate to a permissi-
ble purpose, but his dissents are lukewarm and seem to indicate a 
disinclination to pursue the issue.9s 
In Konigsberg v. State Bar (/!),96 Harlan considered the disclo-
sure issue in the context of occupational qualification. Konigsberg 
had refused to answer questions about Communist Party member-
ship in applying for the California bar. In the first round of appeals, 
the Court held in an opinion by Black that the record contained no 
basis for a finding that Konigsberg lacked good moral character.97 
On remand, he was denied admission on the theory that his refusal 
to answer was an obstruction of the investigation. On appeal, 
Harlan wrote the opinion for the Court, with Black in dissent.9s 
Harlan explained that rules compelling disclosure of prior associa-
tion fell into the class of governmental actions "not intended to con-
trol the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered 
92. /d. at 128. 
93. /d. at 134. 
94. See DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966) (insufficient foundation for 
investigation); Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (legislature failed to 
establish nexus between Communist activities and organizations whose membership informa-
tion was sought). 
95. See DeGregory, 383 U.S. at 830 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gibson, 372 U.S. at 576 
(Harlan, J ., dissenting). 
96. 366 u.s. 36 (1961). 
97. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). 
98. Black used the case as the occasion for a major attack on balancing. See 366 U.S. at 
61-71. 
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exercise . . "99 He found it beyond question that a firm belief in 
overthrowing the government was relevant "in determining the fit-
ness of applicants for membership in a profession in whose hands so 
largely lies the safekeeping of this country's legal and political insti-
tutions."Ioo Nor was Communist Party membership unrelated to 
this inquiry. Hence, Harlan could see no basis for a constitutional 
claim.wt 
Harlan was to return to this question at the end of his career. 
In three 1971 cases, the Court was badly split in determining the 
precise questions which could be asked of bar applicants concerning 
organizational membership.w2 Two cases involved questions about 
membership in organizations advocating violent overthrow; these 
were struck down, I03 but a question about knowing membership 
was allowed where immediately followed by a question about spe-
cific intent.I04 In Harlan's view, the Court was "assuming general 
oversight of state investigatory procedures" by involving itself in 
the details of the phrasing of these question. lOs For him the crux of 
the case was simple: 
I could hardly believe that anyone would dispute a State's right to refuse admission 
to the Bar to an applicant who avowed or was shown to possess a dedication to 
overthrowing governmental authority by force or to supplanting the rule of law by 
incitement to individual or group violence as the best means of attaining desired 
goaJs.106 
The states could properly deny "admission to those who seek entry 
[to the bar] for the very purpose of doing away with the orderly 
processes of law . . . . "101 
As in Konigsberg II, Harlan was at great pains to distinguish 
legitimate investigation from prohibition of speech: 
My Brother BLACK's [opinions in these cases] could easily leave the impres-
sion that the three States involved are denying Bar admission to professionally qual-
ified candidates solely by reason of their membership in so-called subversive 
organizations, irrespective of whether that membership is born of a purely philo-
sophical cast of mind or of a specific purpose to engage in illegal action, or that 
99. /d. at 50-51. 
100. /d. at 52. 
101. /d. at 53. For a critique of Konigsberg//, see Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission 
Cases: An Unfinished Debate Between Justice Harlan and Justice Black, 21 LAW IN TRANSI-
TION, 155, 179-96 (1961). 
102. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); In 
re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971). 
103. Stolar, 401 U.S. at 27; Baird, 401 U.S. at 4-5. 
104. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, 401 U.S. at 164-65. Stewart was the 
swing vote in the three cases. 
105. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 35 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
106. /d. at 35. 
107. /d. at 36. 
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these States are at least trying to discourage prospective Bar candidates from joining 
such organizations .... If anything in these records could fairly be taken as point-
ing to either such conclusion, I would be found on the "reversing" side of these 
cases. The records, however, adumbrated by the representations of the responsible 
lawyers who appeared for the States, in my opinion belie any such inferences. They 
show no more than a refusal to certify candidates who deliberately, albeit in good 
faith, refuse to assist the Bar-admission authorities in their "fitness" investigations 
by declining fully to answer the questionnaires. I 08 
The questionnaires themselves were permissible, being merely "tem-
perate inquiry into the character of [the applicants') beliefs in this 
regard .... "109 
One might well quarrel with the precise location of the line 
Harlan drew between reasonable regulations based on the nexus be-
tween speech and professional qualifications, on the one hand, and 
suppression of dissent, on the other.IIO But the basic point seems 
sound. It is important to be vigilant in guarding against censorship, 
but it is also important not to confuse censorship with regulatory 
measures serving far different purposes.111 It must be remembered 
that Harlan's diligence in stopping suppression of ideas was demon-
strated that same year in his Cohen opinion. 
B 
Justice Harlan's first amendment craftsmanship is evident in 
the obscenity cases. The Supreme Court first encountered the prob-
lem of obscenity in Roth v. United States.112 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Brennan defined obscenity as "material which deals with 
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."II3 So defined, ob-
scenity fell outside the scope of the first amendment because it was 
utterly without redeeming social value.II4 
Justice Harlan found the issues far more complex.JIS Writing 
108. !d. at 34-35. At the close of his dissent, Harlan added: "But if I am mistaken and it 
should develop that any of these candidates are excluded simply because of unorthodox or 
unpopular beliefs, it would then be time enough for this Court to intervene." /d. at 36. 
109. !d. 
110. In retrospect, we believe that Harlan placed excessive reliance on the good faith of 
state officials and correspondingly underestimated the chilling effect of state regulation. 
Ill. For example, in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), the Court struck down 
a statute prohibiting the employment of Communists at defense plants designated as sensitive 
(about I% of all defense plants). While perhaps such a rule is invalid, the majority was 
clearly wrong in viewing it as equivalent to measures outlawing the Party itself. !d. at 287 
(White, J., dissenting). See Gunther, Reflections on Robel: It's Not What the Coun Did But 
the Way That It Did It, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1140, 1146-1149 (1968). For a comprehensive 
discussion of the use of loyalty qualifications for government employment, see Israel, Elf-
brandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SuP. Cr. REV. 193. 
112. 354 u.s. 476 (1957). 
113. !d. at 487. 
114. /d. at 484. 
115. !d. at 496 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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separately in Roth, he criticized the Court for assuming that obscen-
ity is a clear, easily recognizable category of speech, which either 
falls inside or outside the first amendment. Instead, he argued, 
every book has its own individuality and value.ll6 Hence, appellate 
courts cannot leave the obscenity determination to the jury, as the 
majority seemed to contemplate. Instead, appellate courts must 
judge for themselves whether particular works can be suppressed.m 
This part of Justice Harlan's analysis is now the law.us 
The other part of his analysis was never accepted by any other 
Justice.l 19 He believed that states should have much broader power 
to control obscenity than the federal government.12o In his view, 
states could properly decide, as guardians of public morals, that ob-
scene works incite antisocial or immoral acts, or at least induce sex-
ual conduct that a state may consider harmful to society's moral 
fabric.121 State suppression of the material involved in the case 
before him would not sufficiently interfere with the communication 
of ideas to violate the Constitution. On the other hand, Congress 
lacked any substantive power over sexual morality and had only an 
attenuated interest in regulation of pornography. Suppression of a 
book throughout the country could place an intolerable burden on 
free speech, and would also prevent experimentation by the 
states.122 Accordingly, Harlan would have allowed the federal gov-
ernment to ban only "hard-core pornography."J23 
In later opinions, Harlan refined this analysis. In Manual En-
terprises v. Day,l24 he attempted to define more clearly the class of 
materials the federal government could exclude from the mails. To 
fall into this class, a work must not only appeal to prurient interest, 
it must also be patently offensive, which is to say, violative of cur-
116. /d. at 497. 
117. /d. at 498. 
118. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974). 
119. The Court currently applies the same standards to state and federal prosecutions, 
rejecting Harlan's argument for a dual standard. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 
104-07 (1974). The Court's use of local (as opposed to national) standards was, however, 
intended in part as a response to Harlan's concerns. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 
n.l3 (1973). 
120. Because Harlan never accepted the theory that the due process clause directly in-
corporated provisions of the Bill of Rights, he considered the first amendment to apply only 
to the federal government, while state regulation was limited by the somewhat more flexible 
requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 
503. 
121. /d. at 501-02. 
122. I d. at 504-05. 
123. Jd. at 507. For an excellent critique of the early obscenity cases, see Kalven, The 
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 1. 
124. 370 u.s. 478 (1962). 
1985] JUSTICE HARLAN 445 
rent community standards.12s The "community" in question is the 
entire nati0n,126 and mere nudity is not enough to render a work 
patently offensive under this test.l27 A few years later, in the 
Memoirs case, he reiterated his view that the federal government 
can only regulate hard-core pornography.12s 
In Memoirs, Harlan also attempted to clarify his ideas about 
the boundaries of state power: 
State obscenity laws present problems of quite a different order. The varying 
conditions across the country, the range of views on the need and reasons for curb-
ing obscenity, and the traditions of local self-government in matters of public wel-
fare all favor a far more flexible attitude in defining the bounds for the States. From 
my standpoint, the Fourteenth Amendment requires of a State only that it apply 
criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of obscenity and that it reach re-
sults not wholly out of step with current American standards. As to criteria, it 
should be adequate if the court or jury considers such elements as offensiveness, 
pruriency, social value, and the like. The latitude which I believe the States deserve 
cautions against any federally imposed formula listing the exclusive ingredients of 
obscenity and fixing their proportions.l29 
Some charged that this test was unworkably vague. Harlan re-
sponded that as the case law developed, predictability would in-
crease.l3o He also thought that the deterrent effect of vagueness on 
borderline materials could be reduced by the use of noncriminal 
procedures.D' Whatever vagueness remained was, he thought, no 
greater than under the majority's approach.m 
In Ginzburg v. United States,133 a companion case to Memoirs, 
Justice Brennan wrote a majority opinion upholding conviction for 
mailing obscene material. Brennan assumed for the sake of argu-
ment that the materials themselves, considered in isolation, were 
not obscene.l34 But he went on to uphold the conviction anyway 
because the advertising for the materials was permeated by the "leer 
125. /d. at 482, 486. 
126. /d. at 487-88. 
127. /d. at 490. 
128. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney 
Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Between Roth and Memoirs, Harlan 
wrote on some procedural aspects of obscenity regulation in dissenting opinions in A Quan-
tity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215-24 (1964), and Bantam Books v. Sulli-
van, 372 U.S. 58, 78-82 (1963). He also reiterated his Roth approach in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169-
71 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
129. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 458 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
130. /d. 
131. /d. at 458 n.3. 
132. /d. at 459. 
. 133. 383 U.S. 463 ( 1966). In a third case decided the same day, Harlan joined the major-
Ity to uphold the New York obscenity law. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
134. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 465 n.4, 466. 
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of the sensualist."I35 He seemed to find it especially offensive that 
the defendant sought mailing permits in Intercourse and Blue Ball, 
Pennsylvania, before ultimately obtaining one from Middlesex, New 
Jersey.D6 This evidence of "pandering" converted protected speech 
into unprotected obscenity, leaving Ginzburg to serve five years in 
prison for his offensive conduct.I37 In dissent, Justice Harlan wrote 
a blistering attack on ad hoc justice. The majority opinion was "an 
astonishing piece of judicial improvisation"I3s which cast "a dubi-
ous gloss over a straightforward 101-year-old statute."I39 As he 
pointed out, the Court's theory had nothing to do with the charge 
on which the defendant had been tried. Moreover, he observed, 
under the majority's theory, works like Lady Chatterly's Lover and 
Ulysses, which previously had been held nonobscene as a matter of 
law, might once again be banned if evidence of pandering could be 
produced. 140 
Harlan's last word on obscenity is found in United States v. 
Reidel.I41 The issue in Reidel was the effect of Stanley v. Georgia,I42 
which had established a right to private possession of pornography, 
on the validity of the federal statute banning obscene materials from 
the mail. Although Justice Harlan had joined the Stanley opinion, 
he did not view Stanley as affecting the basic holding of Roth that 
obscenity is unprotected by the first amendment.I43 Rather, he read 
Stanley as holding that the government's power to prohibit obscen-
ity cannot be exercised through methods invading other individual 
rights. In Stanley, the relevant right was "the First Amendment 
right of the individual to be free from governmental programs of 
thought control, however such programs might be justified in terms 
of permissible state objectives."I44 For Harlan, 
Stanley rests on the proposition that freedom from governmental manipulation of 
the content of a man's mind necessitates a ban on punishment for the mere posses-
135. /d. at 468. This "pandering" approach to obscenity originated with Chief Justice 
Warren. See G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 250-62 (1982). 
136. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 467-68. 
137. See id. at 497 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
138. 383 U.S. at 495 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
139. /d. at 494-95. 
140. /d. at 496-97. 
141. 402 U.S. 351 (1971). Between Ginzburg and Reidel, Harlan continued to criticize 
the prevailing approach. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-11 
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (concurring opin-
ion at 704); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 771 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He also 
joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 
728 (1970), which upheld a federal statute giving individuals the right to have their names 
stricken from the mailing lists of publications they found offensive. 
142. 394 u.s. 557 (1969). 
143. Reidel, 402 U.S. at 358. 
144. /d. at 359. 
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sion of the memorabilia of a man's thoughts and dreams .... In other words, the 
"right to receive" recognized in Stanley is not a right to the existence of modes of 
distribution of obscenity which the State could destroy without serious risk of in-
fringing on the privacy of a man's thoughts; rather, it is a right to a protective zone 
ensuring the freedom of a man's inner life, be it rich or sordid.145 
In a companion case, Harlan reserved the question of whether the 
federal government could prohibit the noncommercial importation 
of pornography for private use.I46 
It is not clear how history will judge Harlan's efforts in the 
pornography area. It was not until after his death that the Court 
was able to muster a majority for any one approach to the prob-
lem.I47 The current approach combines a modified version of the 
Roth-Memoirs test with the pandering concept rejected by 
Harlan.I4s Whatever its other imperfections, Harlan's approach to 
these cases did attempt to create an identifiable boundary around 
government's control of pornography, so as to protect freedom of 
thought. 
c 
Justice Harlan's most significant contributions to first amend-
ment doctrine may have been in the field of public demonstrations. 
His writings on this problem display an innovative, sensitive ap-
proach to first amendment issues. 
His approach was evident in his first opinion in the area, a con-
currence in Garner v. Louisiana.I49 The defendants in Garner were 
convicted of "disturbing the peace" for a sit-in at a segregated lunch 
counter. They were quiet, orderly, and had never been asked to 
leave by the proprietors. Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion 
reversed the convictions on the theory that there was no evidence in 
the record to show that this sit-in in the deep South might provoke 
a disturbance.Iso Like Justice Douglas,m Justice Harlan thought 
that this was an obvious fact of which the state courts could take 
judicial notice.1s2 Alone among the Justices, however, Harlan saw 
145. /d. at 359-60. Although not an obscenity case, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971), shows that Harlan was unwilling to extend the state's role as moral guardian in con-
trolling offensive speech beyond the established category of obscene literature. For further 
discussion of Cohen, see infra notes 177-87 and accompanying text. 
146. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 377 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
147. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973). 
148. See Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977). See]. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. 
YOUNG, supra note 42, at 1016-18. 
149. 368 u.s. 157 (1961). 
150. /d. at 170-74. 
151. /d. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
152. /d. at 193-96 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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an important first amendment issue in the case. 
At the outset of his first amendment analysis, he stressed that 
the management had acquiesced in the defendants' continued pres-
ence on the property.ts3 Hence, he thought, the defendants had the 
same right to engage in first amendment conduct there as they 
would have had in the street, and "[w]e would surely have to be 
blind"ts4 to ignore the speech aspect of their conduct. For Harlan, 
a demonstration was as much a part of the free trade in ideas as 
verbal expression.tss He acknowledged, of course, the state's inter-
est in preserving public order. He did not proceed, however, to bal-
ance this interest against the right of free speech. As he explained 
in a crucial passage, such balancing would be inappropriate in 
Garner: 
But when a State seeks to subject [otherwise protected speech] to criminal 
sanctions . . ., it cannot do so by means of a general and all-inclusive breach of the 
peace prohibition. It must bring the activity sought to be proscribed within the 
ambit of a statute or clause "narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct 
as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State." . . . 
And of course that interest must be a legitimate one. A State may not "suppress 
free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desir-
able conditions." 
. . . [S]ound constitutional principles demand of the state legislature that it 
focus on the nature of the otherwise "protected" conduct it is prohibiting, and that 
it then make a legislative judgment as to whether that conduct presents so clear and 
present a danger to the welfare of the community that it may legitimately be 
criminally proscribed. I 56 
The seven years following Garner brought a string of public 
demonstration cases before the Court. As commentators at the 
time observed, the Court seemed to have a great deal of trouble 
articulating a theory to cover these cases.ts7 Yet there was a pat-
tern in the holdings. Convictions under disturbing the peace stat-
utes like that in Garner were generally reversed.tss On the other 
hand, statutes focusing on narrower state interests (trespass, ob-
structing traffic, or courthouse picketing) were considered valid on 
their face by nearly every Justice.ts9 The split between liberals and 
153. /d. at 197-99. 
154. /d. at 201. 
155. /d. at 201-02. 
156. /d. at 202-03. 
157. See, e.g., Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. 
Cr. REV. I. 
158. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (breach of peace conviction for library 
sit-in reversed); Cox v. Louisiana (I), 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (breach of the peace conviction for 
courthouse march reversed); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (breach of 
peace conviction for rally at state capitol reversed). 
159. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (prohibition on obstructing access to 
courthouses held facially valid); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (state trespass law 
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conservatives usually involved the application of these statutes. In 
several cases, liberal majorities reversed convictions with arguments 
that appealed to the specific facts of the case, with little attempt to 
articulate a general principle. Sometimes the majority considered 
that the police had misled demonstrators or exercised undue discre-
tion; I60 in one case, a conviction was reversed because the Justice 
whose vote determined the outcome saw signs of racial discrimina-
tion in the facts of the case.I6I Justice Harlan resisted these ad hoc 
arguments and voted to uphold convictions whenever the demon-
strators had violated narrowly drawn, regulatory statutes.I62 
As Street v. New Yorki63 was to show, Harlan's approach could 
be a more reliable safeguard for first amendment values than the 
mere ad hoc approach of Warren and his followers. After hearing a 
radio report of the shooting of a civil rights leader, the defendant in 
Street had taken out an American flag, carried it to the nearest in-
tersection, and burned it.I64 Harlan wrote the majority opinion re-
versing his conviction, with Warren, Black, Fortas, and White 
dissenting.I6s 
valid as applied to private property); Cox v. Louisiana (I), 379 U.S. 536, 553-58 (1965) (sug-
gesting that statute prohibiting obstruction of traffic would be facially valid); Cox v. Louisi-
ana (II), 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965) (prohibition on picketing near courthouses held facially 
valid). 
160. In Cox I, the Court found that the police had established a de facto discretionary 
licensing system for parades, and in Cox II, that they misled demonstrators into thinking that 
they had stayed a sufficient distance away from the courthouse to avoid violating a ban on 
picketing "near" courthouses. 
161. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (White, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
162. Generally, Black and Harlan voted together in these cases. See Adderley v. Florida, 
385 U.S. 39 (1966) (Harlan joins Black's majority opinion); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 
131, 151 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana (II), 379 U.S. 559, 591 (1965) (White 
and Harlan agree in part with Black's dissent); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 344-46 (1964) 
(Harlan joins Black's dissent in favor of upholding state trespass law as applied to sit-in). 
163. 394 U.S. 576 (1969). In 1969, Harlan wrote three other noteworthy first amend-
ment opinions. In Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 130 (1969) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring), he agreed with Justice Black's concurring opinion that states could properly ban 
residential picketing, but that a disorderly conduct statute was too unfocused to serve this 
function. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting), he agreed with the majority that the first amendment applies to the 
public schools, but sought to retain broad authority for school officials to maintain discipline. 
Notably, he did not resort to ad hoc balancing but instead found it necessary to "translate 
that proposition into a workable constitutional rule." Under Harlan's approach, school chil-
dren could establish a first amendment claim only if they could prove that officials were 
motivated by a desire to suppress a particular viewpoint. In the third case, Shuttlesworth v. 
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, !59 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring), Harlan concurred in 
a holding that marchers need not comply with a state permit requirement when that require-
ment has been construed by state officials in a way that would render it unconstitutional, 
given the absence of any speedy method of getting judicial review of their decision. 
164. Street, 394 U.S. at 578. 
165. See id. at 594 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); id. at 609 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 610 
(White, J., dissenting); id. at 615 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
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Although Harlan's opinions hints at the unconstitutionality of 
flag burning statutes,l66 he found it unnecessary to reach the issue, 
because the record showed that the defendant might have been con-
victed for what he said while burning the flag.l67 The dissenters 
protested that Harlan was distorting the record, 16s but his position 
was eminently reasonable. The defendant was convicted under a 
statute making it a crime to "publicly . . . cast contempt upon" the 
flag "either by words or act."l69 The charge filed against him was 
that he "did wilfully and unlawfully set fire to an American Flag 
and shout, 'If they did that to Meredith, we don't need an American 
Flag.' "17o Neither the trial nor appellate courts identified these 
words as an independent basis for the defendant's conviction, but 
neither did they say anything to rebut the presumption that he was 
convicted for the conduct specified in the charge.111 
Having established that the defendant could have been con-
victed for his words, Justice Harlan then turned to a careful exami-
nation of the state interests that might support such a conviction. 
The defendant's words did not constitute incitement or fighting 
words, nor was the statute limited to those areas of unprotected 
speech.m Also, the conviction could not be upheld on the basis of 
the possible shock to bystanders, for any shock effect was due to the 
ideas he expressed, m an impermissible basis for regulation. Fi-
nally, the defendant could not be convicted for failing to show 
proper respect for the flag, for the government has no right to co-
erce such respect.l74 After this analysis, nothing was left to support 
the conviction. Indeed, since the same state interests are implicated 
by flag burning itself,m which Harlan would presumably have con-
sidered expressive conduct, 176 Street indicates rather strongly that 
166. See infra notes 175, 176 and accompanying text. 
167. Street, 394 U.S. at 588-90. 
168. See id. at 595-600 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); id. at 610-12 (White, J., dissenting). 
169. /d. at 578. 
170. !d. at 579. 
171. Since it was constitutional error to charge the use of the words as an offense, the 
conviction presumably could only stand if the error was shown to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 
386 u.s. 18 (1967). 
172. Street, 394 U.S. at 591-92. Note that Harlan used a categorization approach here, 
rather than balancing. 
173. /d. at 592. 
174. /d. at 593-94. 
175. We assume that no one would seriously attempt to uphold a flag-burning statute as 
a means of preventing air pollution. Arguably, burning the flag might pass over into the 
realm of "fighting words," though Cohen suggests at least serious doubts on this score. 
176. If sitting silently at a lunch counter is speech, as Harlan indicated in Garner, it is 
hard to see why flag burning would not qualify for first amendment coverage. In Cowgill v. 
California, 396 U.S. 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in dismissal), Justice Harlan argued 
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flag burning statutes are unconstitutional. 
Like Street, Harlan's last major first amendment opinion was a 
defense of expression that he must have found highly offensive. The 
defendant in Cohen v. Californiam was convicted for wearing a 
jacket with the inscription "Fuck the Draft." Again, Harlan wrote 
for a five-man majority in reversing the conviction for disturbing 
the peace. He began by canvassing "various matters which this rec-
ord does not present."178 It did not involve a statute establishing 
special standards of decorum in a courthouse, where the arrest took 
place. It did not involve any recognized category of unprotected 
speech. Nor did it involve a captive-audience claim. Such a claim 
would require "a showing that substantial privacy interests are be-
ing invaded in an essentially intolerable manner," for "[a]ny 
broader view would effectively empower a majority to silence dissi-
dents simply as a matter of personal predilections." 179 In any event, 
no such claim could be made in Cohen, because no one unable to 
avoid the slogan had actually objected and the statute itself did not 
focus on protection of captive audiences.18o 
Having eliminated these issues from the case, Harlan turned to 
the core issue: whether California could properly remove the of-
fending word from the public vocabulary. 181 The insubstantial like-
lihood of a violent response from the audience could not justify a 
ban, for the states may not engage in censorship just to avoid "phys-
ical censorship" by the "lawless and violent."182 Nor could the 
states, acting as guardians of public morality, eliminate this exple-
tive to maintain "a suitable level of discourse within the body poli-
tic." 183 Matters of taste form no basis for state regulation of speech, 
for "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric,"184 and offensive lan-
guage is an important means of communicating otherwise inex-
pressible emotions.185 More fundamentally, Harlan explained, any 
attempt to render public discourse inoffensive would be incompati-
ble with a free society: 
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be 
only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, 
that there was at least a not insubstantial question whether wearing a vest made of an Ameri· 
can flag was protected conduct. 
177. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
178. /d. at 18 (emphasis in original). 
179. /d. at 21. 
180. /d. at 22. 
181. /d. at 22-23. 
182. /d. at 23. 
183. /d. 
184. /d. at 25. 
185. /d. at 26. 
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within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring 
values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at 
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but 
of strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a 
trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these 
fundamental societal values are truly implicated.186 
Guiding the entire Cohen analysis was a clearly expressed re-
luctance to expand the established exceptions to "the usual rule that 
governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of indi-
vidual expression."1s1 
III 
As Cohen shows, Harlan was far from being an ad hoc bal-
ancer. He was a defender of the freedom to express unpopular ideas 
and an opponent of censorship. In the area of subversive speech, 
for example, he led the way to defining a clear category of unpro-
tected speech. Iss Instead of balancing, he used a much more struc-
tured form of first amendment analysis. In his view, the 
government's power to proscribe the form or content of speech was 
limited to a few clearly defined categories, such as obscenity, incite-
ment to violence, and libe}.Is9 Harlan believed that Supreme Court 
Justices, in deciding whether to create a new category of punishable 
speech, must evaluate and balance the loss of first amendment val-
ues caused by suppression of a type of speech or association and the 
societal end achieved by such a proscription. As Street and Cohen 
should make clear, he did not take this responsibility lightly; he pre-
sumed that content proscription was impermissible except for a few, 
limited categories of cases. Once the Supreme Court defined a cate-
gory of speech as punishable, he favored the use of a test that would 
provide as clear a distinction as possible between punishable and 
nonpunishable speech rather than an ad hoc balancing approach. 
His preference for clear tests in content proscription cases is exem-
plified by his opinions in the Smith Act casesi90 and his approach to 
defining punishable defamation.I91 
186. /d. at 24-25. 
187. /d. at 24. For a more detailed discussion of Cohen, see Farber, Civilizing Public 
Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of 
Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283, 286-95. 
188. See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text. 
189. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. 
190. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Harlan joined the decision in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). He also joined in decisions which strictly applied 
the New York Times rule to protest speech. See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 
295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); 
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In particular situations, where speech might well have an ad-
verse impact on its environment, states were not powerless to regu-
late in order to reduce this adverse impact.I92 But such regulatory 
statutes would be carefully scrutinized. To pass muster, they would 
have to focus narrowly on these non-speech related interests and 
exclude any possibility that their purpose was to censor ideas.I93 
Harlan only engaged in true ad hoc balancing when reviewing con-
tent neutral time, place, or manner regulations.I94 
For Harlan, the core value of the first amendment was freedom 
of thought. As his opinion in Reidel makes clear, the first amend-
ment marks off a sphere of individual independence and freedom 
from mind control.J9s As his Cohen opinion indicates, this freedom 
extends to the interchange of communications that form the "na-
tional mind."I96 Freedom from thought control, then, is the ulti-
mate aim of the first amendment. Harlan used balancing only to 
determine the boundary between this sphere of autonomy and the 
spheres of valid legislative authority. Once he had determined this 
boundary, he rarely balanced again on the basis of the facts of any 
individual case, though he did not foreclose such balancing 
entirely.I97 
In the years since Harlan left the bench, the Court has experi-
mented with various methods of first amendment analysis. 
Whether Harlan's approach offers today's Supreme Court an ideal 
methodology for resolving new first amendment issues may be less 
than certain.I9s What should be clear is his commitment to the 
protection of first amendment values and his rejection, at least by 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). Harlan did struggle with the standard of proof 
that should be applied in such cases, particularly if the case involved defamation of a person 
not truly a public official. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 62 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 293 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion by Harlan); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
385 U.S. 374,402 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U.S. 75,96 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ashton v. 
Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 201 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in result without opinion). How-
ever, Harlan did not favor an ad hoc balancing approach in such cases. See supra note 34. 
192. See supra notes 102-11 and 157-62 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 156, 162 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 149-62 and accompanying text. 
195. See Reidel, 402 U.S. at 359-60. 
196. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25. 
197. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(even statute serving substantial state interest unrelated to the suppression of ideas may be 
invalid when it forecloses a speaker from reaching a specific audience). 
198. We have argued elsewhere that these other approaches are inadequate and should 
be replaced by something similar to Harlan's approach. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 3; 
see also Farber, supra note 2. 
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the end of his tenure on the Court, of ad hoc balancing as a general 
approach to first amendment issues. 
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APPENDIX 
FIRST AMENDMENT DECISIONS IN WHICH JUSTICE 
HARLAN WAS A PARTICIPANT* 
1954-55 Term 
ACLU v. City of Chicago, 348 U.S. 979 (1955) (per curiam) (dissented) 
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (concurred in result) 
Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (wrote dissent) 
Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (joined majority) 
Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458 (1955) (statutory decision) (wrote majority) 
Davidson v. United States, 349 U.S. 918 (1955) (per curiam) (joined majority) 
1955-56 Term 
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (statutory decision) (joined dissent) 
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (joined majority) 
Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (joined majority) 
Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (joined majority) 
Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (statutory decision) (joined majority) 
1956-57 Term 
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (joined majority) 
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1956) (statutory decision) (joined majority) 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (joined concurrence) 
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (wrote dissent) 
Government & Civic Employees Org. Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (per curiam) 
(joined majority) 
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (joined majority) 
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (joined majority) 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (joined concurrence) 
International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (joined 
majority) 
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (wrote majority) 
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (wrote majority) 
Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 {1957) (joined majority) 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (decided with Alberts v. California) (concurred in 
Alberts, dissented in Roth) 
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Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (wrote majority) 
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NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959) (joined majority) 
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majority) 
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Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (joined dissent) 
1960-61 Term 
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Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (wrote dissent) 
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (joined majority) 
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Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961) 
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Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (concurred in result) 
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (joined majority) 
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (joined dissent) 
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (wrote concurrence) 
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (joined 
majority) 
Bargaintown, USA v. Whitman, 367 U.S. 903 (1961) (per curiam) (joined majority) 
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Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (wrote concurrence) 
Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961) (joined majority) 
Cramp v. Board of Pub. lnstr., 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (joined majority) 
Nostrand v. Little, 368 U.S. 436 (1962) (per curiam) (joined majority) 
Association for Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Power, 369 U.S. 816 (1962) (per 
curiam) (joined majority) 
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962) (statutory decision) (joined dissent) 
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (wrote dissent) 
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1962-63 Term 
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majority) 
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1963-64 Term 
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Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (wrote dissent) 
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Drews v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 547 (1964) (per curiam) (joined dissent) 
Williams v. North Carolina, 378 U.S. 548 (1964) (per curiam) (joined dissent) 
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Mitchell v. City of Charleston, 378 U.S. 551 (1964) (per curiam) (joined dissent) 
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dissent) 
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I (1965) Ooined majority) 
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Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (wrote dissent) 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (wrote concurrence) 
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Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967) (per curiam) (joined majority) 
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Robert-Arthur Mgmt. Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968) (wrote dissent) 
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Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (per curiam) (joined majority) 
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Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (joined majority) 
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1985] JUSTICE HARLAN 
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Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (wrote dissent) 
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